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I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2008 will represent a critical point in the history of fair housing in the 
United States. Unfai r lending practices and unsustainable loans have released a 
torrent of foreclosures across the nation, hanning our neighborhoods, crippling our 
national housing market and weakening both the national and international 
economy. 1 Unequal access to fair housing and more imp01tantly, fair credit, sits at 
the core of our current global econom ic crisis.2 We not only have a duel housing 
market but also a dual credit market.3 As we begin to pull back the layers of 
complexity around the housing and credit cris is. we see that the history of racial 
discrimination, redlining, a new global market with inadequate oversight and poor 
enforcement of existing housing laws all contributed to our current crisis. What is 
often not addressed in our eva luation of this crisis is why the overrepresentation 
subprime or predatory loans (and foreclosures) occurred in Black and Latino 
communities. When this is discussed. the popular yet inaccurate narrative is that 
those people took out loans they knew they could not afford and banks were forced 
to loan to them because of the Community Reinvestment Act.~ This inaccurate but 
popular narrative suggests that effons to loan to these communities of color lie at the 
heart of our global crisis. This story or narrative is not just incomplete but is 
factually wrong; in fact, this narrative can lead to dangerous assumptions which 
could undermine fair housing. The lesson that is likely learned from such a story is 
to not loan or invest in these historically redlined communities, but instead to tightly 
lock them out of the credit market.5 These communities that were historically left 
1See CHRIS PETERSON, TilE KIRWAN lNST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, 
SUUPRIME LENDING, fORECLOSURE AND RACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF 
SECURI11ZATION IN R£SIOF.NTIAL MORTGAGE fiNANCE I (2008), http://4909e99d35cada63e7f 
75747 1 b7243be73e53e 14.gripelements.com/pdt:<;/Peterson _Securitization _Primer.pd f. 
1
.1uliana Babassa, Report: Minorifies Hit by Foreclosures, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2008, 
http://www .usatoday. cornlmoney/econo my/housing/2008-03 -06-minori ty-foreclose_ N .htm. 
3See CHRISTY ROGERS, THE KIRWAN lNST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, 
SuBPRIME LOANS, FoRECLOSURE AND THE CREDIT CRISIS: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY?- A 
PRJ MER 4 (2008). http://4909e99d35cada63c7t75747 I b7243be73e53e I 4.gripelements.com/ 
pub! ications/foreclosurc-and _race _primer _dec-2008.pd r 
4The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2005), intended to meet 
the depository needs of the communities, including low and moderate income communities, in 
which they operated. The Federal Reserve Board, Community Reinvestment Act, 
hnp://www.fcderahescrve.gov/dcca/cra (last visited Mar. 27. 2009). 
>Redlining is detined as ·'credit discrimination hy a financial institution that refuses to 
make loans on properties in allegedly bad neighborhoods." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY !283 
(7th ed. 1999). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/4
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out of the exploding new housing and credit market in the '40s, '50s and '60s may 
once again lose ground to the white community in terms of both home ownership 
and wealth, and be lockl!d out of the housing market again as we recov~r from this 
recent crisis. 
The tremendous damage inflicted on our communities of color from this 
challenge represents a true crisis facing these communities and our nation. It also 
demonstrates the deep interconnection between these marginalized communities and 
our entire global system. But crisis represents more than just peril-it also 
represents a turning point, or "an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which 
a decisive change is impending."" The current housing crisis has already spurred 
perilous conditions and uncertainty, but also new actions and possibilities. in order 
to benefit from the opportunity, we must have an approach that understands the 
forec losure issue as a credit issue. We must aggressively and affirmatively pursue 
fair and opportunity based housing, and we must more adequately understand the 
role of race. 
A monumental event in our nation's history occurred on January 20, 2009-the 
inauguration of President Barack Obama, our nation's first Afrkan American 
president.7 This tremendous achievement presents another critical, yet broad, tuming 
point in our nation's engagement with racial justice, not just in terms of fair housing, 
but in how we view race and integration in our society. This accomplishment 
produces both risks and opportunities for those concemed with racial justice and fair 
housing. President Obama and his administration may lead a new era with policies 
supporting racial equity, integration with opportunity and a sustained commitment to 
community development. 
However, these positive implications are offset by a national dialogue which may 
undermine our commitment to racial justice.~ Many pundits are asking if President 
Obama's election indicates that we are in a "post-racial" America, where race 
doesn't represent a significant barrier to opportunity.Q This viewpoint presents just 
another iteration of the "colorblind" approach to dealing with race in our society. 
We strongly disagree with this view, and lind this argument flawed and uninformed 
by the systemic barriers to opportunity facing most people of color in our society. 
We fear that this flawed discussion has serious implications fo r how our nation views 
the need to continue to pursue the goals of racial justice. such as fair housing. 
This turning point in our history will eventually yield new opportunities to 
address our nation 's fair housing and credit challenges and our potemial for 
advancing racial equity. For better or worse, our housing and credit system in the 
U.S. will be permanently altered and translonned. As ~air housing advocates, 
scholars and researchers we must ask if these changes will promote or suppress fair 
6Merriam-Webster Online Dictit>nary, http://www .merriam-webstcr.com/dictionary/crisis 
(last visited Mar. 11. 2009). 
7Carl Hulse, Obama Is Sworn in as 44th President, Trll· N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 20, 2009, 
http://www. n ytimes.com/2009/0 J /21 /us/pol itics/20web-i naug2.html. 
REI lis Cose. Revisiting "The Rage <!(a Privileged C/as.\ ... Nr.wSWEEK. feb. 2. 2009. 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/ 18J 272. 
QShelby Steele, Ohama 's Post-Racial Promise. L.l\. TIMF.S, Nov. 5. zoog, 
http://www .Ia ti mes.com/ncwslop in ion tcommentary/ la-oe-stee le5-2008nov05, 0,65 53 798.story. 
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housing, racial justice and true integration with opportunity. The larger fair housing 
community must be at the forefront of these changes, affirmatively pushing to assure 
that the restructuring of housing linance and credit options benetits those 
communities of color most marginalized by our current structural and institutional 
arrangements. 
We a lso must communicate our perspective on race into the national dialogue 
spun·ed by the election of President Obama. The fair housing community must 
ensure that our goals are not lost in this new ·•post-racial" rhetoric. 10 When we look 
at the structure of lending and housing, we see a system where race is extremely 
important. The comfortable claim that people self-segregate is belied by these 
practices. We find many of the conditions that perpetuate and maintain segregation 
from opportunity, including credit, not just in the conscious animus of individuals, 
but deeply embedded in our institutional practices as well as our unconscious 
attitudes. Before our nation can claim to be post-racial, we must first acknowledge 
and confront the systemic layers of disadvantage facing people of color. 
Fair housing and true integration with opportunity is the key to dismantling these 
discriminatory structural atTangements. As fair housing advocates, we must be sure 
that the public is aware of these dynamics and we must continue to demand 
accountability from our institutions. Title VII I gives us a handle to begin to address 
some of these issues. 11 It reaches discriminatory ~::ffect and is not just limited to 
discriminatory intent- its call lor affirmati'vely pursuing to the goals or fair housing, 
produces the potential to create a proactive role for government to produce fair 
housing.' ! 
The tollowing paper provides an assessment of the current housing and credit 
crisis from a racial justice lens. The paper explores how race was interwoven into 
the current crisis and demonstrates the racia lized impacts of the housing and credit 
crisis. u We also explore some of the current challenges racing fair housing in our 
society, presenting concepts and models of reform to promote true integration with 
opportunity. 14 We close with a new paradigm lor addressing fair housing in the 
future and utiliz ing the opportunities presented by this crisis to produce a fair 
housing opportunity and a just society for all. 15 
10john a. powell , Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism. 86 DENV. U. L R.f.V. 
(forthcoming 2009), a1·uilable at http://4909e99d35cada6Je7 t7574 71 b 7243be73e53e 14. 
gripelemenls.com/publicat ions/post-racial ism_ or_ targcted _universal ism _powell_ l'eb2009 .pdf. 
11Titlc VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (i.e. , the Fair Housing A~:t) prohibits 
discrimination in the sale. rental and linancing of dwellings based on race, color, religion, sex 
or national origin. Fair Housing and Equa l Opportunity Programs. http://www.hud.gov/ 
ollices/lheo/progdesd litleX.cfm (last visited March 27. 2009). 
1 ~See Hanson v. Veteran~ 1\dmin., ~00 F.2d 1381, 1386 ( 1986) ("showing or a significant 
discriminatory ~::fti!ct'. ~::stab l i s h~s violation of Title VIII). 
"s .... e infi·a Pan II. 
14See i1!lra Part II L 
1\ ) c:c: il!fi"a PurtiV. 
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II. FRO'v1 TilL IN'\JER CITY TO WALL STREET /\"ll) B FYO'\ID: TilE C'RFDIT CRISIS AND 
GLOBAL SYSTEMS OF MARGI ALIZATION 
The housing and credit crisis presents a dilrieuh racial equity challenge tor the 
traditional advocacy community to tackle. In our global economy. advocates are 
directly conti·onted by a tnte systemic global challenge which produces disparate 
local outcomes. The media often represents th is challenge as a case of Wall Street v. 
Main Street. 16 In reality. the global scope of this crisis stretches beyond Wall Street. 
touching financial centers and nations across the globe, from Europe to Asia. 17 The 
crisis does not represent just one or two bad actors, but a system that is poorly 
structured and inadequately regulated . 18 Our failure to understand this crisis as a 
systems breakdown, and not just an individual moral breakdown, is critical to 
understanding the challenges in existing pol icy reforms to stem the crisis. Do we 
assign blame to people or the system? Do we redesign policies to make people 
behave differently or do we restructure the system to produce better outcomes?''' 
Unfortunately, many efforts to understand and respond to this crisis ignore this 
global aspect of the challenge. We must not view this crisis as singular. but 
understand that in our ever more interconnected world and global economy, these 
systemic global challenges will continue to arise as sockties and economics around 
the world become more tightly interwoven. 
A. Securiti::.ation. Deregulation. and the Credit Crisis 
The origins of the housing and credit crisis extend well beyond the behavior of 
borrowers and lenders. The introduction of credit securiti~a t ion (and an associated 
deregulation or linancial services) was critical to the growth of the subprime industry 
and arc at the root of the current credit crisis. ~(t As described by Chris Peterson at the 
1
''Se<' i'\ina Easton. Main Street Tums Against Wall Street. FORl UNF., Sept. 2R. 2008. 
111 tp ://money. cnn .com/2008/09/2 6/ncws/economy /easton_ back lash. lbrtu ne/i ndex. htm; Mark. 
Trumbull. Credit Cri~·is Hu.,· Main So·ecl Wa1clting ·wall Slreet, CIIIOSTIAN SC.'IEN<:E M ONITOR, 
Aug. 13. 2007. http ://www.csmonitor.~om/2007/081 J/pO I sO 1-usec.html. 
111:3cth 1\ nn Bovino, The (j/obal Economr: Slmng 1/('(u/H•inds for Europe and Asiu, 
lltJ'>INI:S\ WEL'K, Mar. II, 2009. http://ww\\'.husincsswcck.com/invcstor/content/mar2009/ 
pi2009031 () 6 125lJ3.htm'!tampaign_id=r!>s,_null. 
1 ~'11< 1' 1 ::; ,, MAR I'IN & CAITLIN WATT, Till: K IRWAN I N~ I , I OR 'l'llb S l'lli>Y OF RACE & 
F. riiNI<'II Y. St •BPRIMt·. CRISIS: A CoMPRt::IIF.NSIVF ANAl vs1s moM ,, Svs n:Ms T HINKIN<i 
P~RSI'I:t' t IV F. (2008), htlp://4909e99dJ5cada63c7 1757471 b7243hc73c53e 14.gripelem~.:nts.com/ 
puhlicminns/Subprimc Crisis_Analysis_From Systems_ Thinking Pcrspective_Aug2008.pdf. 
1
'
1Wc arc not ussening a mutually cxclusivc binary between people's moral behavior and 
thc functioning of systems. But our popular narrative overly locuses on '·bad actors."-either 
in minority communitit:s or on Wall Street. This is a simplistic narrative which leads to a 
gros~ misunderstanding of the problem and solution. We have incentive strth.:turcl' that help 
\hape action on I he pan of in\'e~tors. hut our current laws and regul.ll ion, arL' dt·~igm·d li>r an 
anti4uated ''' o pany system in the changing glnhal credit marh·l \\ c al't' ha' c (lllr 
di-;cu~sion that action around the credit markc[ i' largely sealcd oil' from a discussion of 
lbrcdosure and the needs ofminorit) communities in the United Slates. These non-connected 
and individualistic polic) responses "ill not be an cffccth c approach to remedy a housing and 
credit :.ystcm which is stnu;tured poorly. 
~0RoG~RS. supra note 3. at 6-7. 
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University or Utah Law School, securitization was critical to the development of 
modern capital markets: 
In recent years, Wall Street financiers opened up a new frontier of home 
mortgage lending to Americans of relatively modest means with minimal 
down payments and through exotic, untested financial products. Capital 
markets largely funded this new breed of aggressive subprime mortgage 
finance through "securitization"- the process of bundling assets, such as 
mortgage loans, into large pools and then reselling those assets as 
securities to investors. Financiers justified this new private "subprime" 
home mortgage market to leaders and to the American people with a 
promise of new opportunities for home ownership. Today, the course of 
events has proven this promise to be, at least for the time being, empty.21 
The first use of securitization by Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac provided a model 
which the private sector found enticing, with Bank of America and Salomon 
Brothers initiating the first mortgage backed securities in the late 1970s.12 
Additional congressional acts, such as the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement 
Act of 1984, encouraged the growth of securitization by reducing legal barriers to 
mortgage securitization.23 The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 and Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act helped set the 
stage for the growth of the subprime industry by easing restrictions on mortgage 
interest rates and preempting state regulations on non-traditional mortgages.24 The 
growth of private sector mortgage securitization spread financial risk and created a 
new pool for global investment, further fue ling the availability of subprime 
mortgages.25 
With the expansion of the global economy and a growing pool of global 
investment capital, mortgage securities became a popular investment: private 
mortgage securities doubled between 1994 and 1998.26 But the financial industry 
needed new markets to invest in and needed c-ontinued mortgage loan growth to 
support the global demand for mortgage securities.27 Subprime loans and other non-
traditional mortgages extended loans under unusual terms to many new borrowers, 
who may not have qualified for traditional mortgages.28 As the subprime market 
tlourished, lenders and brokers became less risk adverse and reckless, with more and 
more borrowers directed toward subprime products.29 They were also able to shift 
21 PETERSON, supra note I, at I. 
22/d. at 8. 
23 /d. at 8, n.77. 
2~MARTIN & WATT, supra note 18, at 2. 
~5ROGERS, supra note 3, at 6-7. 
26PETERSON, supra note I, at 12, n. I l R. 
27See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Patrick McGeehan, Lenders Try 10 Fend Ojf Laws on 
Suhprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at Cl. 
~8See id 
~9See Max Fraser, The Housing Folds: The Housing Markel and Irrational Exuberance, 
THE NATION, Nov. 25 , 2008. http://www.thenation .com/cloc/200812!5/fraser; Associated 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/4
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more risk to the borrower.30 Because many of these loans were held for short periods 
of time, lenders were less concerned aibout their worthiness.31 Brokers were 
incentivized to generate as many loans as possible as their commission was 
dependent on the number of loans they originated and not long tenn loan 
performance.32 As a result of these complex changes in the regulatory environment 
and global financial markets, the mortgage industry changed (see Figure 1 at 
Appendix).33 Lenders were bundling and selling loans and were not as concerned 
with the long term sustainability of the loan.34 As explained by Kevin Phillips: 
[Mortgage backed securities] were sectoral growth hormones as wen as 
profit makers. Instead of being kept on finn ledgers, mortgage loans 
could be stripped of risk by derivative contract, or in most circumstances 
sold off in a mortgage backed security or structured COO. The money 
received could be used for another loan or mortgage, then again-and 
again. Lending limitations became non limitations. However, as volume 
swelled, loan and mortgage making standards dropped. Enticements to 
sign up marginal borrowers-through the "exotic" forms of mortgages 
little used before-took on an ever larger role.3s 
With risk spread throughout various mortgage securities, unsustainable loan 
originations became a powerful profit generating mechanism in the industry.36 
Brokers responded to the "yield spread premium" they were awarded for issuing 
subprime loans, further incentivizing the growth of the subprime market.37 
Unfortunately, regulatory systems did not necessarily adjust to the changing 
Press, Brakers. Bankers Play Subprime Blame Game, MSNBC, May 22, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1 8804054/. 
30See Fraser, supra note 29. 
) lid. 
32See Brokers, supra note 29. 
33See irrfra app. Fig. I. Our housing market has gone from a two or three party system to a 
very complicated system that very few people understand. Our laws, regulation and oversight 
are based on this three party system. A graph of this two and three party system was created 
by the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race & Ethnicity, a multiparty system figure created 
by Chris Peterson at the University of Utah. The figure was adapted from a presentation 
delivered at the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race & Ethnicity National Convening on 
Subprime Lending, Foreclosure and Race, October 2-3, 2008 (available at 
http://www. kirwaninstitute.orglevents/archi ve/subprime-conveninglagenda.php ). 
34See PETERSON, supra note I, at 12, n.ll8. 
35KEVIN PHILLIPS, BAD MONEY: RECKLESS, FINANCE, FAILED POLITICS, AND THE GLOBAL 
CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 104 (2008). 
36See David Olinger & Aldo Svaldi, Examining the Subprime-Lending Crisis, THE 
DENVER POST, Dec. 2, 2007, http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_7612850 ("One-hundred 
eighty-two billion or more in profit was shared by brokers, lenders and investment banks."). 
37JAMES LARDNER, BEYOND THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN: ADDRESSING THE CURRENT 
CRJSIS AND AVOIDING A FUTURE CATASTROPHE 9 (2008), http://www.demos.org/ 
pubs/housingpaper_6_24_08.pdf. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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marketplace.3s But as the amount of credit in the world grew, it continued to search 
out new markets.39 The teds encouraged looking to the housing market and not at 
the treasury.40 The most undeveloped housing markets in the United States were in 
the Black and Latino communities, markets that were still experiencing the effects of 
redlining-reverberations from policies in place d!ecades before.~' The securitization 
of the m011gage market created a constant desire for new loan o riginations, pushing 
bankers and brokers to make more loans and originate loans faster. 42 The subprime 
and Alt-A market became the ideal product targeted to untapped lending markets.4J 
The subprime market grew from $150 billion in 1998 to more than $625 billion by 
2005.44 Similar growth was seen in the Alt-A loan market, which grew by 660% in 
fi ve years, from $60 billion in 2001 to $400 billion in 2006.45 
Many communities of color provided the untapped markets for these subprime 
Joans.46 Lender behavior grew more reckless, with a surge in hybrid option ARM 
subprime loans making up 80% of the subprime market in 2005 and 2006.H There 
was an assumption that housing prices could continue to rise.48 Even if an individual 
could not pay, the underlying value of the proper1y would protect the investor and 
the investment pool.49 This was not just an assumption by lenders; it was also shared 
by Alan Greenspan.50 As new institutions and brokers got into the housing credit 
market, there were few regulations in these uncha•·ted waters.~' There were a number 
38/d at 5 ("regulatory bodies favored the short-term interests of bankers and lenders over 
the public interest"). 
39Id. at 9. 
40See Brokers, supra note 29. 
41 See LARDNER, supra note 3 7. at 8, 15-1 (,. 
42ld. at 20. 
43Basical\y, Alt-A loans are considered riskier than A-paper. or ·'prime." and less risky 
than "subprime,'' the riskil·~t catt:gMy. 
4~1RA GOLDSTEIN & DAN UREVK'K- AO:F.l.SBEIW, Till' KtRWAN l~ST. ~OR THE STUDY Of 
RACE AND ETHNICITY, SUIIPRIMF. LI:NDING, Mtm f(iA(iE rORI:CLOSURES ;,:..:n RACE: HOW FAR 
H AVE WE COME AND HOW FAR H AVf \V F 10 Go" 5 (.200X). http:/14009c99d35cada63c7 
17574 7 1 b7243be73e53e 14 .gripelcments.comtpdfs;goldstl:!in _tr( paper. pdf. 
4S /d. 
46
AMAAD RIVERA ET At.. . UNil ED FOR A f .\11< ECONOMY, FOKH LOSF.D: STATI~ 01· T HE 
DREAM 2008 (2008), http://www. fairecoawmy.org/ tiles/ St:.lleOfDrcam_ 0 1_ 16_ 0R_ Web.pd[ 
47LARDNER, supra not~ 37, at 7. 
48See Brucl! Bartlett. J:flho Saw tltt> Ht>u;:,in?. Rt1bble C'!>llllll_':::'. FORBES. Jan. 2, 200<), 
http://www.forbes.com.'2008/ 12/31 /houstng. -tmbblc-cr:lsh-oped -ex_ hb_ 0 I 0-:!bart lett.html. 
49See id. 
sold. 
51See Anthony Faiola ct a l., Whut 1-fcnt Wrong. THE W .•.SH. PoST, Oct. 15, 2008, 
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contcnt/article/2008/ I 01141 AR2008l 0 l4tl334J _p[ 
html. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/4
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of wrong assumptions. One was that the market would regulate itself.52 Another 
was that there would not be a housing bubble nationwide.53 We were using the 
equity and growth in housing in pan to make up for the stagnant wage structure that 
existed since 1973.'~ Inevitably, risky loans began to go into default.55 Foreclosure 
growth choked the hous ing market, suppressed home values, devalued securities and 
set off shock waves throughout the national and global economies. 56 The systemic 
and reinforcing nature of this widening crisis was described by the think tank Demos 
in their report. Beyond rhe Mortgage Meltdown: 
As prices fall, household wealth erodes. consumers spend less, businesses 
cut back, jobs disappear, and still more people have trouble making 
mortgage payments. These are the pathways that led from last year's 
mortgage crisis to this year's looming recession. They could be carrying 
us toward someth ing bigger than a recession: a mutually reinforcing 
downward spiral in the housing market and broader economy.57 
Their 2008 prediction was prown conect, with the fall of 2008 seeing an escalating 
spiral of economic disruption. 5~ The foreclosure crisis decimated the perceived 
wealth in the market's mortgage backed securities, exposing the financial risk and 
poor health of some or our major financial institutions. Trillions in wealth 
evaporated on Wall Street and some of the oldest and largest corporations in the 
world have faced bankruptcy (or currently teeter on insolvency).59 As the economic 
consequences of this phenomenon grows, diminished home prices and job losses will 
52/d. 
53See Krishna Guha, Greenspan Alert on US House Prices, fiNANCIAL TIMES, Sept. t6, 
2007, http://www.ti.com/cms/s/0/31207R60-647f-l I dc-90ea-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_ 
check= I. 
5~JARF.D B ERNSTFIN & LAWRENCE MISHF.L, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, ECONOMY'S 
GAINS FAIL TO REACH MOST WORKERS' PAYCHECKS (2007}, http://www.epi.org/ 
publications/entry/bp 195/. Real wage trends, after adjusting for inflation, have remained 
largely stagnant lor low and high wage workers between 1973 and 2007; whereas the real 
wage trends for high wage workers during the same time has increased. /d. 
55 See ROOFRS, supra note 3. 
56Roger Allman, The Great Crash. 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS. Jan./Feb. 2009. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090 I 0 I faessay881 0'1 /roger-c-
altman/the-g.reat -crash-2008. html. 
57LARDNER, supra note 37, at 3. 
58Alexandra Twin, Another Huge Dow Loss, CNNMONEY.C:OM, Oct. 15, 2008, 
http://rnoney.cnn.com/2008/ l 0/ 15/markets/rnarkets_newyork/index.htm; Lcs Christie, U.S. 
Homes Lose S2 Trillion In Value ln '08, CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 16, 2008, http://money. 
cnn.com/2008/12/ 15/real_ c state/underwater_ borrowers_near _12million/index. htm. 
5'~Jonathan D. Glater, Advamages of Corporate Bankruptcy Is Dwindling, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2008, at Bl; Jessica Dickter. Personal Bankmptcies on the Rise, CNNMONEY.COM, 
http:l/money.cnn.com/2008/ 1 0/24/pllbankruptcy _li lings/index.htm: Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
Lehman Files.for Bankruptcy. Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 14,2008, at AI; Katie Merx, 
GM Grapples to Avoid 1-"i/ing Bankruptcy as Cash Vanishes, D ETROIT FREF. PRESS, Nov. 8, 
2008 (West). 
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encourage more foreclosures, fueling and feeding the systemic crisis already 
underway/'° Currently, nearly one in ten mortgage holders are either in foreclosure or 
delinquent on payments.6 1 Recent U.S. Federal Reserve estimates indicate that 
throughout 2009 the U.S. economy will continue to shrink, reaching a national 
unemployment rate of nearly 9% by the end of2009.62 At this state only a sustained 
and significant government intervention can stop the widening crisis. 
This crisis clearly exposes the delicate and interconnected systems which 
dominate our twenty-first century global society: systems which, for better or for 
worse, link the fate of all communities, nations and people. Analyzing these 
systemic connections can help us understand how poor lending practices in places 
like East Cleveland can be fueled by the behavior of financial titans on Wall Street 
and conversely, where escalating foreclosures in the inner city can escalate and 
wreak havoc on the entire U.S. and global economies. We live in a new age, which 
requires a new way of thinking, a new paradigm for understanding that we impact 
the rest of the world and the world impacts us. 
B. Global Systems of Marginalization and an Advocacy Response 
When systems fail, marginalized communities bear the brunt of this failure. 
Often, as global systems change or are reordered, marginalized communities bear the 
burden of this change, while the benefits accrue to the elite.63 As global commerce 
has expanded and systems around the globe have changed, inequality has grown, 
primarily in nations with poor social safety nets, poor social norms and policies that 
do not support full societal membership.64 Just as the globalization of industry has 
spurred the growth of sweatshops in the Global South, the growth of the credit and 
financial crisis disproportionately burdened our marginalized communities in the 
U.S. Larger systemic challenges facing our society are often first evident in 
marginalized communities or among marginalized populations. This phenomenon is 
described in the Miner 's Canary by Lani Guiner and Gerald Torrez.65 If we would 
60Pallavi Gogoi et al., Bailout Plan: Foreclosure Issue Still a Major Hurdle, USA TODAY, 
Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2009-02-l 0-bailout-details _ N .htm. 
61Les Christie, 7.5 Million Homeowners "Underwater," CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 31, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/J 0/30/real_ estate/undetwater _ borrowers/index.htm; Alan Zibel, 
Record 1 in 10 Americans Are Delinquent on Mortgage, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5. 20{)8. 
http://www.cleveland.com/realestatenewslindex.ssf/2008/12/record I in I 0 
americans_are_d.html. - - - -
62Jeannine Aversa, Economy Will Sink Further, Fed Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 19. 
2009, http://www .dispatch.com/live/contentlnational_ world/stories/2009/02/ 19/fed _economy 
_0219.ART _ART_02-19-09 _AI_E4CVCS6.html?sid=l01. 
63JOHN A. POWELL & S.P. UDAYAKUMAR, RACE, POVERTY AND GLOBALIZATION, POVERTY 
AND RACE, POVERTY AND RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL (2000). 
64PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL l29 (2007); Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, For 
Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, § 6, at 62; Christopher Jencks, Why Do So Many Jobs Pay 
So Badly?, in INEQUALITY MATTERS: THE GROWING ECONOMIC DIVIDE IN AMERICA AND JTS 
POISONOUS CONSEQUENCES 129-131 (James Lardner & David A. Smith eds., 2005). 
65LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 12 (2003). 
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only address these systemic challenges early, we would prevent them from 
expanding to our friends and neighbors. True fair housing, integration with 
opportunity. and sustainable and fair credit practices would have helped us avoid 
much of the global consequences of the housing and credit crisis. In respondjng to 
these systemic challenges we must focus our energies on these communities most 
impacted by the crisis, the communities that are disproportionately burdened by 
systemic discrimination or "structural racialization.'166 
The current housing and credit crisis presents a powerful case study of how 
systems can produce disparate outcomes for marginalized communities. Fair 
housing advocates are at the forefront of dealing with this crisis, but many are at a 
loss when attempting to understand how to intervene in the complex global dynamics 
which created the crisis. Actions in Congress, on Wall Street and in global tinancial 
centers around the globe resulted in discriminatory lending behaviors, vacant 
properties and community distress in our backyards. Although this systemic crisis 
presents an unusual challenge for traditional fair housing advocates, we must not 
shrink away from the challenge just because of its systemic complexity and global 
reach. 
Our communities are pan of the global system and vulnerable to a new set of 
challenges which are dynamic and interactive. We argue that these systemic 
challenges will become more frequent in the future, especially as our global world 
becomes more interconnected. The broader social justice community must be 
prepared to learn how to effectively intervene into these new global systemic 
challenges. Be it foreclosures created by the credit crisis, job losses due to 
globalization or another challenge like climate change, advocates must assure that 
marginalized communities are actively involved in designing solutions to these 
challenges. In the case of the housing and credit crisis, as fair housing advocates we 
must not only be at the table but at the forefront as we redesign critical housing and 
credit systems and institutions (such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
Ill. THE RACIAL FOOTPRINT OF THE CREDIT CRISIS 
There is clear and irrefutable evidence that in the case of the housing and credit 
crisis, communities of color were disproportionately burdened by the crisis.67 Race 
is a critical and salient lens to understand the current credit crisis, and the current 
crisis is a significant lens to view the overall state of fair housing for communities of 
color. What is less clear is why. Conservatives might argue that it is because the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) caused banks to make bad loans to 
irresponsible people.68 While there certainly were many bad loans, they were not 
66Structural racialization refers to the ways nn which the joint ()perations of institutions 
produce raciaJized outcomes. JOHN A. POWELL, STRUCTURAL RACIALIZATION AND IMPLICIT 
SOCIAL COGNITION (2008), hltp:/174.125.95.132/search?q=cache:vL406C8yV5cJ:4909e99d35 
cada63e7f757471 b7243be73c53e 14.gripelements.com/presentations/2008 _ 6 _ 19 _ NLADA _Pie 
nary_SR_and_ IB.ppt+structural+racialization&cd=2&hl=en&cr=clnk&gl=us&client= tirefox-
a. 
67 See RIVERA, supra note 46. 
68See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve System, The Community 
Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges, Speech at the Washington D.C. 
Community Affairs Research Conference (Mar. 30, 2007). 
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caused by the CRA, but more the result of the new global credit market and the 
lending frenzy it was creating. Liberals are more likely to see discrimination against 
communities of color as the reason for the high foreclosure race in these 
communities.6'> While this may have been a factor, in some cases there was a less 
nefarious goal of lenders trying to tap an undercapitalized market.7" This desire to 
extend credit to tht:se undercapitalized markets was not only an approprialL~ goal 
then- it continues to be an appropriate goal nn\\'. What was missing in this 
extension of credit was an evaluation of the tenns. Credit needs to be extended to 
these historically credit maligned communities, but the terms of credit need to be 
sustainable and fair. Instead of oftering sustainable and fair credit, our pricing 
structure for dealing with risk in underserved communities was to create exploitative 
credit terms that set the borrower up for failure. 71 The following section of this paper 
reviews the factors contributing the racialized impact of the credit crisis and reviews 
the overall impact of this crisis to both communities of color and fair housing in our 
nation. We close this section with a case study of Cleveland, one of the epicenters of 
the subprime crisis, looking at the intersection of race, fair housing and the credit 
crisis in Cleveland. 
A. Race and the Credit Crisis: Whar the Evidence Finds 
Across the nation, communities of color were heavily burdened by both 
discriminatory lending and foreclosures.7~ While some people should not have 
gotten a loan, many received the wrong type of loan and unsustainable terms. 
Nationally, estimates found that people of color were more than three times as likely 
to receive a subprimc loan and approximately half of loans given to people of color 
were subprime.73 Research by the Center for Responsible Lending found in 2006 
that 52% of home loans for African American families were subprime; these figures 
were 40% tor Latino families and 22% for White families.74 In 2005, Federal 
Reserve data found 55% of Blacks who took out mortgages received subprime 
products, compared to 17% of Whites and Asians.75 Even after factoring out tor 
financial differences between White and Non-White borrowers, people of color were 
more than 30% more likely to receive a subprime loan.76 
6QPosting of JctT Tone to The Liberal Curmudgeon Blog, Republicans Plared Acth·e Role 
in Subprime Loan Mess. http://www.thelibcralcurmudgeon.com/2001\/ l 0/rcpuhlicans-plnyctl-
active-role-in.html (Oct. 12, 2008, 15:30 EST). 
711See RIVERA, supra nme 46. 
1 1See Babassa, supra note 2. 
12See JAMES ll. CARR. NATIONAL COMMUNITY RI, INVJ;STMt.:NT (t)AI.J fiON, Rt-SJ>ONLJIM' 1 () 
TilE fOR t:CLOSUR E CRISIS, 18 HOUSIN(I POLICY DEliA rF (2007 ). 
73See RIVERA, supru note 46. 
74Ct:NTER FOR RI':SPONSIBLI-. LENDING, A SNAI'SIIO.I OF THE SIJfl i'RIMI~ MARKI·T 2 (2007), 
lltlp ://www. respons i blclend i ng. org/pd ts/snapshot-o f-thc-su bprimc-ma rkct.pd r. 
·:"Sue Kirchoff & Judy Keen. Minwitic!s Hit Hartl b1· Rising Cost ofSubprimt.> Loans. USA 
TOD!\ Y. Apr. 25. ~007. hllp://w\\ w .usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2007 -04-25-
:;uhprimc-m i nori tie~-u!lat_N .him. 
"~~•Dr·nuJc CiRIIt-Nsn·.Jf\i llonAN, K ... , , ,, s. r·:1ms1 & WEI L1, CENTER FOR R~:sPoNsmu. 
LFNI)JI\j(;. l.INF:\11{ LF'II)IN(;; Till' F.IIH. I (\1- R,\( I' ,\Kl) E·l HN I(.:ITY ON THE PRI('l: OF St ' IWRIMI 
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The footprint of these loans was not only racially disparate but also 
geographically disparate, with communities of color victim to significant 
concentrations of subprime and other non-traditional or predatory loan products.77 
Research by the U.S. Federal Reserve from 2004 to 2006 found that communities 
with significant minority populations received large concentrations of subprime 
loans.7K With a strong link between subprime or predatory loans and foreclosure, 
people of color and communities of color are being devastated by the rise in 
foreclosures. '" Early in the foreclosure crisis. approximately one in ten Black and 
Latino borrowers were affected by foreclosure, compared to less than one in twenty 
White borrowers.80 Race and the credit crisis are tightly interwoven, with 
communities of color and people of color explicitly targeted by poor lending 
practices and most burdened by the escalating crisis. 
B. Race and the Crisis: The Residua/Impact of History and The Ghost ofRedlining 
Why were people of color and communities of color so disproportionately 
impacted by the crisis? To answer this ques tion. we must look at both the current 
challenges facing communities of color and tbe residual impact of historical patterns 
of disinvestment and discrimination in these communities. Historically, 
communities of color were systematicall y denit:d credit through public and pri vate 
policies.81 The notorious FHA "red lining'' maps of the I 930's illustrated 
government sanctioned policy to rank racially mixed or segregated communities of 
color as hazardous investments and discourage financing tor these communitics.x1 
This publically sanctioned disinvestment was followed by widespread private 
disinvestment and discrimination in these communities, producing a long term era of 
undercapitalization for our nation 's communities of color.R.1 This era of 
undercapitali:zation was followed by a period of capitalization through discriminatory 
lending products.8~ Jesus Hernandez at the University ofCalitornia- Davis identifies 
three eras of undercapitalization intlicted on communities of color.R' First, from 
MOKTGAGES 3 (2006), http://www.responsiblclcnding.org/pdfs/rrO I l -Unfair_Lending-
0506.pdr. 
77R J('K Com:N. Till·. KIRWAN INSTIT. FOR Til~ S·l UL>Y OF RA<:l' i\ND ETI INICITY. NAT.L 
CONVENING ON SUflPRIME L ENOING. FORECLOSURt AND RACE, A STRUCTURAL R ACISM LENS 
ON SUBI'RIMF. FORL:CLOSUR!'S ANO VA CANT PROPERTIES 4 (2008). 
7~G01 DSTE. IN & URF.VICK-AU:I:LSllEKG. supra mole 44. 
7
<)LARI)NER, supra note 37. at 15-6. 
~0ELLEN SCHI OF.Mt:R !:T AI. .. CENTEH FOR Rr.SI'ONS IBL~ L ENI>JN(j, L OSING GROUND: 
FORECLOSURES IN THE SUilPRIME MARKEl ANL> TH~IR COST HJ I-IOMFOWNERS 23 (2006). 
http://www.responsiblelendi ng.org/pdfs/toreclosurc-paper-rcport-2-17 .pd f. 
SIGREGORY D. SQUIRI-:S, CAPITAL AND C'll'-'1MIJNrll f'S IN B LACK AND WHI rF.: THE 
INTERSECTION OF R ACE. Cl ASS. ANIJ UNEVEN DEVEUWMJ.NT 52 ( 1994 ). 
~.lSee id. 
H~See id. 
x;JESUS H ERNANDF.L, WRinEN T ESTIMONY SUAMITT£::1> TO TilE NATIONAl. COMM ISSION ON 
FAIR HousiNG AND EQUAL OI•PORTUNITv CoNNF.CTrNo SE<;REGATION To CoNTEM PORARY 
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1930 to 1950, publically sanctioned re<llining and restrictive covenants 
undercapitalized communities or color and reinforced segregation.&6 In the second 
era. from 1950 to 19RO, public policies such as urban renewal and the federal 
highway program drove White flight. decimating assets in communities of color.87 
Finally. in the post-1980 "reverse redlining" era, a string of discriminatory lending 
products were targeted into these historically undercapitalized and segregated 
communitics.s~ Hernandez found a concentration of subprime and other high cost 
loans in rhe traditionally red lined communities in California.89 In the age of reverse 
redlining, credit discrimination shifted from outright denial to the emergence of a 
dual credit system .~0 This dual credit system offered products for the majority at 
prime rates but provided credit to marginalized borrowers at excessively high interest 
rate~ and cost. ''~ 
After being starved of credit and investment for nearly half a century, predatory 
actors intiltrated these communities with a number of predatory services, from 
payday lender<: to furniture rental ~tores, from "buy here, pay here'' auto dealers to 
subprime loans. Residents of these segregated communities were more likely to be 
lower income or economically marginalized. placing them in a precarious financial 
position, extremely sensitive to sudden losses in income or unexpected expenses. 
Homeowners of color in these communities provided great targets for mortgage 
brokers.92 These homeowners had some limited home equity but were lower income: 
so lenders who aggressively marketed and promised cash back via refinancing 
provided an enticing offer tor those concemed with other financial troubles. This 
phenomenon may help explain why half or all subprime loans were actually 
refinance loansY' Due to relatively low home ownership rates and little experience 
with mortgage lending, borrowers in these communities were less aware that they 
were being given unusua l or high cost loan terms.94 
HOUSING CREDIT PRACTICI3S .A. NO fORECLOSURES: A CASE STUDY OF SACRAMENTO 4 (2008), 
http://www. prra<: .orglprojects/fair _hnus ing_ comm issi on/1 os _angeles/hernandez. pdf. 
R~see id. 
g1See id. at 7. 
s~See id. at ~ 0-11: seC' also Gregory D. Squires. Predato1y Lending: Red/ining in Reverse, 
139 SHE I. rF.Rf'ORCF. ONLI"JI: , Jan./Feb. 2005, http://www.nhi.org/online/issues!l39/ 
rcdlining.html. 
MQHF.I~I'.:ANDE%. supra note 85. at 10. 
'J!lGoliath.com, Cal!fi.Jmia Bonks Continue to Fail African American and Latino 
BmTOI'vers: Mortgage Lending Study Reveals Dual Credit System, http://goliath.ecnext.com 
(last visited Apr. 6. 2009). 
'"See id. 
'
12GOLDSTF.IN & UREVICK-ACKcLSHERG, supra note 44. 
'
1
·
1(ENT£R f-OR RFSPONSIBLE LENDI!>!G. 14 SUBPRIME L ENDING: II. N ET DRAIN ON 
HoMEOWNF.RSHir (2007), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Net-Drnin-in-Homc-Owner 
ship.pdf. 
94
DEBHII: GI{UENSTEIN BOCIAN, K eiTH S. ERNST & WEI Ll, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LeNDING, STEEREil W!HJNU: BROKERS. BORROWERS. AND SUBPRIME LOANS (2008), 
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Given tinancial incentives for pushing lucrative subprime products. brokers 
exploited these vulnerabilities. using aggressive marketing in these communities to 
lure in new borrowers and then steer inexperienced borrowers into high cost loan 
products.95 By the late years of the subprime loan era, lenders were steering nearly 
half of borrowers who qualifi·ed for prime credit into subprime products.96 Historical 
undercapitalization created communities ripe for exploitation by unfair lending 
practices; subprime loans are just a more recent and extreme manifestation of 
discriminatory credit concentrated in vulnerable communities.97 
In the end, a perfect storm of systemic barriers to opportunity produced 
widespread vulnerability in communities of color.9~ As lenders looked to expand the 
pool of borrowers to fuel the securitization fire that was overtaking Wall Street, these 
communities provided perfect targets for non-traditional and predatory lending 
products.99 As a result, communities of color became both the most exploited 
population in respect to this crisis- the root of escalating foreclosures which 
eventually ensnared our entire housing market and economy. 1110 
C. Why Is this Crisis so Damaging to Communities (?!"Color? 
Before the current housing and credit crisis, a number of fair housing challenges 
degraded access to opportunity for people of color. 101 The damage infl icted upon 
communities of color as a result of the credit and housing crisis will significantly 
frustrate fair housing goals and exacerbate many of these existing conditions. As we 
look toward the future of fair housing. we must not only take stock of the ongoing 
fair housing challenges that burdened communities of color prior to the crisis, but 
also assess the direct impacts of today's crisis on the lair housing challenges facing 
these communities in the future. 
I. Fair Housing Challenges Pre-Credit Crisis 
Heightened attention has been focused on rhe fair housing implications of credit, 
lending, and foreclosure in light of the credit and housing crisis. 102 This additional 
http://www.responsibldending.org/pdfs/stecrcd-wrong-brokers-horrowers-and-subprime-
loans.pdf; see also LARDNER, supra note 37. 
95See LARDNER, supra note 3 7. 
96Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Suhprime Debacle Traps Even VetJ" Credit-Worthy. WALl. 
ST. J. , Dec. 3, 2007, at A I. 
97Richard Williams et al., The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending, in 
52 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 181-208 (2005). 
'
18See id. 
99See id. 
100See id. 
101See JONATHAN BROWN & CHARLES BENNINGTON, RACIAL R EDLINING: A STUDY OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY BANKS AND MORTGAGE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES, GIS 
FOR EQUITABLE AND SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES ( 1993), http://public-gis.org/ 
reports/redindex.htrnl. 
102john a. powell, R~jlections on rite Past. Looking ro the Future: The Fair Housing Act at 
40,41 IND. L. REV. 605 (2008). 
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energy and attention is needed, but fair housing scholars and advocates must 
continue to focus on the preexisting fair housing challenges plaguing communities of 
color. Broadly speaking. although there have been some victories and progress in 
the forty years after the enactment or the Fair Housing Act, our nation has still fallen 
far short of meeting the goal of true fair housing and integration with opportunity for 
people of color. 103 Minority suburbanization and the slow growth of minority 
homeownership rates must be placed in the context of persistent racial segregation, 
extremely racialized concentrated poverty, excessive housing cost burdens for people 
of color and increasing rates of school segregation.104 
Consider that in 2000, nearly one in ten Blacks living in the 100 largest 
metropolitan areas were living in high poverty neighborhoods. 105 Three out of four 
of the three million people living in concentrated poverty in 2000 were Black or 
Latino.'~ The fact that more minorities can be found in the suburbs than the inner 
city has not lessened these numbers; in fact our suburbs are now home to more 
people in poverty than our cl!ntral cities. 107 Research indicates that minorities who 
leave tor the suburbs are more likely to be re-concentrated in distressed suburban 
communitics.108 Integration has become more challenging as our metropolitan areas 
are becoming more polarized. with middle income neighborhoods on the decline. 109 
Residential rates or segregation remain high, with dissimilarity index results for our 
nation's metropolitan areas remaining at .65. indicating that nearly two out of three 
White or Black residents would need to relocate to produce integrated 
neighborhoods. 110 White dissimilarity rates have dropped faster in smaller, less 
diverse metropol itan areas; in our larger diverse metropolitan regions the decline has 
104john a. powell, Race. Plu(·e om! Opporlllni~)l. 19 AM. PROSPECT, A21 -23 (2008). 
1n5U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Special Reports. Areas with Concentrated Poverty: 
!999 (July 2005). www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/censr- t6.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
106Paul Jargowsky, Studding Progrl'ss, Hidden Problems: The Dramatic Decline of 
CuncentratC'd Pm·erty in the 1990's. TilE BROOKINGS INSl'ITUTION (2003), http://www. 
brookings.edu/es/urban/publicalions/jargowskypoverty.htm. 
107Haya El Nasser. Minorities Reshape Suburbs. USA TODAY, July 9, 2001, 
http://www. usatoday.cl)mincws/nation/census/200 J-07 -09-burbs. htm. 
111&Samamha Friedman & Emi l) Rosenbaum, Does Suburban Residence Mean Better 
Neighborhood Conditions jbr A II !lousehold1·?: Assessing the Influence of Nativity Status and 
Race!Etlmici(l'. 36 SOCIAL SCIF.NCE RESEARCH 22-24 (2007); Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce, 
Minori~r Suburbani;;ation and Racial Change: Stable Integration, Neighborhood Transition, 
and the Need {or Regional Approaches, REPORT OF INSTITUTE ON RACE AND POVERTY 
(presentation at the Race and Regionalism Col!{ercnce, MN May 6-7. 2005); Monifa Thomas, 
Suburbs No Guura111ee of' Opportuni~y; Af(luem 8/ack-1 Leaving the Ci~y Tend to Cluster in 
Just a Few Communities. Ina Mm· Offer Limited Economic Benefits or Access to Good 
Schools. Johs, Clll. SUN-TJMI:S, No\'. 15. 2005, at 6. 
1
mGeorge Galster, et al.. Where Did They Go'! The Decline of Middle 
Neighborhoods in Metropolitan America, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 
ww w. brook i ngs.cd u/n:ports/2006/06pnvert y-booza.aspx. 
Income 
(2006), 
11
'
1E. Glaeser & J. Vigdor, Racial Segregation in the 2000 Census, THE BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (200 I ). http://www. brook ings.edu/dybdocrootles/urban/census/glacser. pdf 
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been at half the rate found in smaller less diverse areas.'' ' Despite changes in our 
metropolitan landscape in the forty years since the enactment of the Fair Housing 
Act, residential segregation- most notably for African Americans- remains 
persistent, and true integration into communities or opportunity for most people of 
color remains an elusive goal. 
A complex web of factors contributes to persistent denial of fair housing and 
integration with opportunity for communities of color. 11 ! These dynamic, persistent 
and reinforcing challenges existed betore the current credit and housing crisis and 
will continue to persist after the crisis. First, we must remember that the housing 
market serves people or color poorly; our market rarely builds and provides housing 
at prices which meet the income conditions found in the Black and Latino 
communities. Even before addressing the policy and persona l contributors to denial 
of housing opportunity, we must be clear that our current housing system is failing 
most people of color. For example, our research here in Franklin County, OH (home 
county to Columbus) found that in the early part of the past decade. more than 90% 
of all new single family homes were unaf1ordable to the median income Black and 
Latino family in the region.".l In 2000. more than 40% of African American 
households in the State of Ohio had "housing problems" related to affordability. 
crowding, or substandard housing.11" Similar conditions can be found in housing 
markets throughout the nation. 
Personal and institutional discrimination in the housing market continues.tt~ 
Steering and "editorializing" by realtors reinforces patterns of residential 
segregation, while outright discrimination in the market has declined but is still 
problematic. 116 But public policy with respect to housing, land use, zoning, 
development and education plays a profound rok in upholding residential 
segregation and denial of housing opportunity for people of color.117 
111 John Logan, Ethnic Dil·ersity Groll'!i: NeighhorhooJ Integration Lags Behind, Ll:WIS 
MUMFORD CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE UR13AN ANI) RWIONAt. ANALYSIS (2001), 
http://mumford l.dyndns.org/cen2000/report. htrnl. 
112 See BROWN & 8 ENN1Nti1'0N, supra note I 0 I. 
113john a. powell & Jason Reec~. The Kirwan lnst. lur the SIUdy of Race and Ethnicity, 
Housing Need and Opportunity in Franklin County. Ohio: An Assessment of Housing Need 
and Opportunity Based Housing for Frank I in County. Ohio (2005 ). http://4909c99 
d35cada63e7f7574 71 b7243be7 3c53e 14.gripeil:mcnts.com/publications/BR EADHousingRepor 
t.pdf. 
114U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Cons('llidated Plan, CHAS 2000 
Database. http://www.huduser.org/datasets/cp.html (last visited Mar. 9. 2009). 
ll 5See John Yinger. Housing Discriminmiun Is Still Worth Won:ring Ahour, 9 HOUSIN(i 
POLICY DEBATE 893-927 ( 1998); see also The Cn:~1:s of Sl.'gregarion: 2007 Fair Housing 
Trendy Report, NATIONAl. FAIK HOUSING ALLIANCE, Apr. 30. 2007. 
www.nationalfairhousing.org. 
116George Galster & Erin Godfrey. By Words and Deed~: Raciol Steering hy Real Estate 
Agents in the US in 2000, 7 1 .1. AM. PLANNING Ass'N 251. 253 (2005 ). 
ll 7See john a. powell. Sprmrl. Fragmemation. and the Persistence of Racial Inequality: 
Limiting Civil Rights l~v Fragmenting Spat'!.', in URUAN SPRAWL: CAUSES, CoNSioQUEN<.:ES, 
AND POLICY RESPONSES (Gegory Squires ed. 2002): john a. powell, 2002 Report of the 
Citizens· Commission on Civil Rights: Rights at Risk, Equulity in e111 Age of Terrorism, in 
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Although the days of explicitly sanctioned government housing discrimination 
are gone, a number of facially race neutral factors produce clear racially disparate 
and discriminatory outcomes for people of color.118 Localism and exclusionary 
zoning (and similar land use policies) produce severe obstacles to the development 
of affordable and rental housing, which denies access to opportunity-rich 
communities for most people of color. 119 Despite clear evidence of the racially 
disparate outcomes of exclusionary land use policies, the courts are split as to 
whether there must be intent. While Title VIII has been interpreted to not require 
intent in some circuits, others have read intent into the statutes. •~o 
In addition, land use policies and infrastructure policies which encourage 
suburban sprawl have heighted the opportunity divide facing inner city communities 
of color. 121 Court decisions which have limited the possibility of interregional school 
desegregation (focusing only on intercity desegregation) have contributed to the 
racial segregation in our metropolitan regions and encouraged White flight. m: 
Finally, subsidized housing (which in metropolitan areas disproportionately serves 
people of color) is largely concentrated in distressed and segregated 
neighborhoods. 123 Although the era of traditional public housing towers is ending, 
much of our nation 's subsidized housing inventory in metropolitan areas is found in 
our central cities, usually in more segregated and higher poverty neighborhoodsY" 
In 2000, 75% of federally subsidized housing and 59% of Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC) units were located in central cities, while only 37% of the nation ·s 
population resides in central cities.'25 In 2000. the average metropolitan 
neighborhood had a poverty rate of 13%, while the average neighborhood with 
URBAN FRAGMENTATION AS A BARRIER TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2002); George Galster. 
Residentictl Segregation in American Cities: .4 Contrary Review. 7 POPULATION RESEAI{CI I 
AND POLICY REVIEW 93-1 12 ( 1988). 
11sMenendian et al., A Report to the U.N. Committee for the EliminUiion uf Racial 
Discrimination 0f7 the Occasion of Its Review of the Periodic Report of the United States of 
America (Feb. 2008). http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/terd/docs/ngos/usa/USHRN2. 
doc. 
11 ~See Pendall, Rolf. Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of £refusion, 66 J. A!\1. 
PLANNING Ass'N 125-42 (2000): powell. 2002 Repon of the Citi:ens' Commission on Ch·i! 
Rights, supra note 64. 
120 Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp .• 429 U.S. 252. 287 ( 1977). United States 
v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 11 79. 1186 (8th Cir. 1975). 
'" 'john a. powell, Achieving Racial Justice: What's Sprmvl Gotto Do with It:'. POVERTY & 
RACf. Sept.-Oct. 1999, http://www.prrac.org/full_text.pnp?text_id=292&item _id= 1841 &news 
letter_ i d=46& header=Search%20 Resu Its. 
1 2~See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
12.1See Florence W. Roisman, Long Overdue: Desegregation Litigation and Next Steps to 
End Discrimination and Segregation in the Public Housing and Section 8 Eristing Housing 
Programs, CtTYSCAPE. 1999, hup://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscape.html. 
124See id. 
1 ~5Lance Freeman, Siting Affordable Housing: Location and Neighborhood Trends of Low 
Income Housing Tax Credir Development~ in the 1990s. THE BROOKINGS INS1TftJTlON (2004). 
http://www. brook i ngs.edu/urban/pubs/20040405 _Frecman.pd f. 
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LIHTC units bad a poverty rate of approximately 20%. For the average 
neighborhood with other types of subsidized housing, the poverty rate v.as zq%. 121' 
2. New Challenges Post-Credit Crisis 
The foreclosure crisis is expanding housing pressure on tamilics of color, 
creating widespread financial hardship for homeowners of color and decimating 
many communities of color. Families immediately impacted by foreclosures race 
great economic hardship and dislocation, and must seek new housing in a lightening 
rental market. 117 Renters are also being unexpectedly displaced as inner city property 
investors are allowing properties to go into default. 128 The social fabric of 
neighborhoods is ripped apart when homeowners and renters are displaced and 
children are forced to relocate to new schools. '~Q Communities of color, many of 
which had faced a number of challenges already, such as high poverty, disinvestment 
or vacant properties prior to the foreclosure epidemic, are now facing extreme 
conditions. The foreclosure crisis is producing widespread vacant properties, which 
act like a toxin in the urban environment, poisoning the health of the entire 
community. Do The growth in vacant properties is further dragging down property 
values, creating extensive blight and safety risks in communities of color and in 
some cases spiraling stable neighborhoods into a permanent state of distress, as well 
as undermining entire cities. 131 For people of color and others living segregated in 
these neighborhoods, the crisis is creating widespread burdens. ensnaring all 
residents, even those who are not facing foreclosure. m The impact of living in one 
of these neighborhoods is cumulative and not adequately captured by just focll.lsing 
126/d. 
121 David Rothstein, Collateral Damage: Renters in the Foreclosure Crisis , PoucY 
MATTERS OHIO, June 2008, http://www.policymattersohio.org/Collatera1Damage2008.hun; 
Danilo Pelletiere & Keith Wardip. Renters and the Housing Credir Crisis, PovERTY & RM·r 
July/ Aug. 2008, https://www2398.ssldomain.com/nlihc/doc/Pe lletiere-Wardrip-7 -~-OR 
PRRAC.pdf; DANILO PELI.ETIERE, RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE: D EF!NIN(i TilE PRO'BI.EM. 
IDENT!FYINO SOLUTIONS, NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (2009), 
https:l/www2398.ssldomain.com/nlihcldoc/renters-in-foreclosure.pd[ 
128See Rothstein, supra note 127. 
129See id. at 10. 
130See David Kraut, Hanging Out the No Vacancy Sign: Eliminating the Blight o( Vanmt 
Bui/dingsfrom Urban Areas, 74N.Y.U. L. REV. 1139(1999). 
131See Scott Simon, In Cleveland. Foreclosures Decimate Neighborhoods. National Public 
Radio (May 24. 2008), http://www .npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyld.,.907 45303; 
Robert Gavin. As Foreclosures Widen, a Neighbvrhood Erodes. Crisis Tests Mam· in North 
Lav•rence, THE BosTON GLOUE, Oct. 7, 2007. http://ww\\>.boston.com/realestatc 
/news/articles/2007/ 1 0/07/as_foreclosures_ widen_:l_neighborhood_ erodes/: Kraut. supra note 
130; William Spelman. Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for Crime?, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 4R I 
( 1993); R. TAYLOR & A. HARRELL, PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND CRIME, NAIIONAL INSTrrun; 
Of JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT, Jan. 1996, http: //www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/physenv.pdf. 
132Kraut, supra note 130, at I 143-52. 
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on the number of home in foreclosures; residents face a variety challenges outside of 
housing, including education, economic health, and public health. 133 
Research also finds the crisis will bave significant impacts on the racial wealth 
gap in the U.S. In 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau studies found the disparity between 
assets held by White households and Black households to exceed 900%, thus for 
every $1 held in assets for Blacks. Whites held $9 in assets. 134 Home equity is the 
primary source of assets and wealth for American households, therefore disparity in 
home equity is a significant contributor to the wealth gap. 135 Wealth is critical to 
advancement and stability in our society and a far more important indicator of 
financial well being than income. 136 Due to assets lost directly from foreclosure and 
the home equity losses from surrounding foreclosures, the wealth impacts of the 
crisis on people of color are predicted to be tremendous. 137 United for a Fair 
Economy's 2008 study on the wealth impacts of the crisis projected a net loss of 
nearly a quarter trillion dollars in assets for Black and Latino homeowners. 138 In 
addition, research indicates that Black and Latino borrowers are also draining their 
existing non home-based assets (e.g. savings and retirement accounts) to avoid 
foreclosure. 139 This phenomenon, described as "asset stripping," is depleting the 
other assets held by borrowers of color, just before they lose their home equity via 
foreclosure. 140 
The foreclosure crisis also could bring about a new wave of redlining or 
substantially restricted credit for borrowers and communities of color. 141 As 
financial attempts to stabilize and stem their exposure to future loss, credit will be 
rnore difficult to obtain. 142 People of color who have been directly impacted by 
IJJ /d. 
134 U.S. Census Bureau, Household Economic S!Udies. Net Worrh and Asset Owne1:ship 
1998-2000, http://www.censusbureau.biz/prod/2003pubs/p 70-88.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 
2009). 
135/d. 
136See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN TH,E RED: RACE. WEALTH, AND SOCIAl. 
POLICY IN AMERICA (Univ. of Cal. Press 1999); see a/su MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. 
SHAPIIW, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 
(Routledge 1995 ). 
137Ed Cutlip, Subprime Crisis Causing Historic Wealth Loss for People of Color, MEDIA 
MOUSE, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.mediamouse.org/news/2008/02/subprime-crisis.php. 
1 3~RIVERA, supra note 46. 
139See Hannah Thomas, Brandeis University, Panel Presentation at the Kirwan Institute for 
the Study of Race and Ethnicity National Convening on Subprime Lending, Foreclosure and 
Race (Oct. 2. 2008) (transcript available ar http://kirwaninstitute.org/events/archive/ 
subpri me-convening/agenda. php ). 
140See id. 
141To live in a marginal neighborhood segregated from opportunity negatively impacts al l 
people including Whites living in such neighborhoods. The impact of this creates a negative 
incentive to live in such neighborhoods. 
142Valeria Fernandez, Communities Foreclosed, COLORLINES, Jan./Feb. 2009, 
http:/ /color! ines.com/article. ph p?l D=4 7 5. 
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foreclosure will find their credit permanently marred for years.143 Their 
neighborhoods will continue to be locked in a credit system that does not serve them 
well and does not lead to effective participation in the larger credit market. 144 
Borrowers who have not been foreclosed upon themselves will still face a restrictive 
lending environment. 145 Borrowers of color seeking to refinance are also more likely 
to be impacted by declining home values and will be more prone to denial for 
refinance loans. 146 Some evidence of these trends is already apparent. Nationally, 
the racial divide is starting to widen in mortgage applications. with mortgage 
applications down 40% for Black and Latino borrowers, compared to 19% for White 
borrowers. 147 In Ohio, the racial divide in mortgage denials has grown between 2005 
and 2007: in 2005. 29% of African American borrowers were denied purchase loans; 
this figure was up to 36% in 2007. 148 For Black borrowers looking to refinance. 50% 
were denied in 2005 compared to 60% in 2007. 1'19 An increasingly tight and 
restrictive credit market will only further expand the denial of prime credit to 
borrowers and communities and create further impediments to fair housing. 
D. Cleveland, 01-1: A Case Study 
Cleveland, like Detroit and other rust belt regions, is at the epicenter of the credit 
and housing crisis. 150 As one of the most segregated metropolitan areas, Cleveland 
suffers from a number of fair housing challenges which have long predated today's 
housing and credit crisis. 151 With a Black/White residential dissimilarity index 
143See Vikas Bajaj & Ron Nixon, For Minorities. Signs of Trouble in Foreclosures, THF. 
NEw YORK TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage .html?res =9505E7D 
D I E3EF931 A 15751 COA9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
144See Simon, supra note 131 . 
145See id. 
146See Bajaj & Nixon, supra note 143 . 
147Solomon Greene. Open Society Institute, Panel Presentation at The Kirwan Institute for 
the Study of Race and Ethnicity National Convening on Subprime Lending, Foreclosure and 
Race: Philanthropic Response to the Subprime and Foreclosure Crisis (Oct. 2, 20011) 
(transcript and presentation available at http://kirwaninstitute.org/events/archive/subprime-
convening/a.genda.php) (citing forthcoming data from the Furman Center for Real E,state and 
Urb(.ln Policy at NYU). 
148
.JEFFREY D. DILLMAN lOT AL .. RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN OHIO MORTGAGE 
LENDING, HOUSING RESEARCH & ADVOCACY CENTER (2006), http://www.thehousing 
center .org/docman/Down load-docu ment/15-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparities-in-Ohio-Mortgage-
Lending-2006.html; JEFFREY D. DILLMAN ET AL., PERStSTTNG RACIAL AND ETHNIC DnSPARITH;S 
IN OHIO MORTGAGE LENDING, HOUSING RESEARCH & ADVOCACY CENTER (2009). 
http://www. thehousingcenter.orgldocman/Down load-docu ment/61-Persi sting-Racial-Ethnic-
Disparities-in-Ohio-Mortgage-Lending -F ebmary-2009. htm I. 
149/d. 
150 LJSA NELSON, A LOOK BEHIND THE NUMI3ERS: FORECLOSURE fiLINGS IN CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY. THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK Or CLEVELAND I (20011), http://www.clc:velandfed.org/ 
Our_Region/Community_Development/Publications!Behind_the_Numbers/2008/0908/ALBT 
N_ Vl_ll.pdf. 
151/d. 
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ranking of .77, the Cleveland metropolitan area has the seventh highest rate of 
Black/White residential segregation in the nation. 1 5~ The average African American 
household in the Cleveland region lives in a neighborhood with a 24% poverty rate 
in 2000, more than three times the poverty rate experienced by the average White 
household's neighborhood poverty rate of 7.5%. 153 In 2000, data from HUD 
indicated that nearly 40% of African Americans and 43% of Latinos living in 
Cuyahoga County had housing problems (primarily due to cost), compared to 24% of 
Whites. 154 
These preexisting fair housing challenges have been exacerbated by 
discriminatory lending and escalating foreclosures. ;ss Black and Latino borrowers in 
the region are far more likely to be denied mortgage financing and retinancing.151' In 
2006, 13% of Whites were denied a home purchase loan, compared to 40% for Black 
borrowers and 23% for Latinos.' 57 In 2006, more than half of Black borrowers were 
denied refinancing loans. 15M African American and Latino bonowers were a lso 
disproportionately burdened with high cost loans. In 2006. nearly 70% of home 
purchase loans and nearly 60% of refinance loans were high cost loans; these figures 
for White borrowers were 20% and 28% respectivelyYQ 
Further, high cost loans were disproportionately concentrated in the city's 
communities of color, primarily African American neighborhoods on Cleveland 's 
152For ranking.s and dissimilarity indices see Lewis Mumtord Center, Metropolitan Racial 
and Ethnic Change - Census 2000, http://mumford.albany.edu/census/WholePop/ WP 
download.html (download data from ·'Option 2" by selecting "200o,·· "Entire metro area," and 
"Dissinularity indices·') (last v isited Mar. 12. 2008). 
15
>Lewis C. Mumford Center ror Comparative Urban and Regional Research at the 
University of NY Albany. Measuring Neighborhood Inequity Graph. http://mumford. 
albany.edu/census/SepUneq/PublicScpDataPagesl l680msaScp.htm (last visited Mar. I 2, 
2008). 
1.s
4SOCDS CHAS Data, Housing Problems Output for Black Non-Hispanic Households. 
http://socds.huduscr.org/CHAS/CHASj ava.htm (select "Housing Problerns," "Ohio.'' "2000." 
"Black Non-Hispanic Households," "County,'' "Cuyahoga'') (last visited Mar. 12, 2008): 
SOCDS CHAS Data. Housing Problems Output for Hispanic Households, 
http://socds.huduscr.org/CHAS/CHASjava.htm (sekct ·'Housing Problems," ··ohio.'' "2000,'' 
"Hispanic Households;· "County.'' ··cuyahoga'") (last visited Mar. 12, 2008): SOCDS CHAS 
Data, Housing Problems Output for White Non-Hispanic llouseholds. 
http://socds.hudusc.;:r.org/CHAS/CHAS_java.htm (select ·'I lousing Problems," "Ohio," ·'2000," 
"White Non-Hispanic Households," ''County:· ··Cuyahoga") (last visited Mar. 12. 2008). 
155See JEFFREY D. DILLM:\N (T AI. .• THE STATf 0 1· FArR HOUSING IN NORTHEAST OHIO: 
APRIL 2008, HOUSING R ESEARCH & ADV()("ACY C ENTER (2008). hllp:l/www.thehousing 
centcr.org!Publications/Rcsearch-Reports.htrnl. 
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East Side, where more than two out of three mortgages were high cost loans. 1w As a 
result of these lending disparities, foreclosures escalated throughout the region, with 
extreme concentrations of foreclosures and vacant properties in many of the region's 
urban communities of color. 161 Research by the Center on Urban Poverty and 
Community Development at Case Western Reserve University in 2008 found that 
one-third of subprime loans made in Cuyahoga County resulted in foreclosure 
(compared to a 4% default rate for prime loans) and that the top twenty subprime 
loan originators in 2005 produced 82% of all foreclosures. 162 Both low and high 
income Black borrowers were more likely to receive subprime loans, and 28% of all 
loans made in 2005 to Black borrowers resulted in foreclosures. 163 The cost of 
foreclosure is severe: a 2008 study released by Community Research Partners 
estimated the financial cost to the City of Cleveland as more than $35 million, due to 
the city's vacant properties.1M Residents in foreclosure stricken neighborhoods are 
dealing with growing neighborhood blight, declining property values, increased 
crime, vandalism, and widening neighborhood instability_l 65 Families who have been 
foreclosed upon are thrust into a difficult housing market and growing financial 
instability. 
Fair housing advocates, local non-profits, neighborhood groups, and local 
governments have made significant efforts to stem the c risis in Cleveland and 
throughout Ohio.'~" But, these institutions do not have the resources to effectively 
stem the extent of the crisis. Prior to the economic stimulus bill passed in February 
of 2008, only $4 billion had been allocated by Congress to address the vacant 
property produced by the crisis via the Neighborhood Stabilization grants, while 
$700 bi llio n was given to the financial sector to stabilize lenders.167 For example, 
10
°Fl>r a map image of high interest loans in Cuyahoga County, see Tracking High-Interest 
Lending. CLEVELAND.CQM NEWS, Mar. 12, 2009. http://www.cleveland.com/news/ wide/ 
inckx.ssf?lendingO 122.html. 
161 Dan Harkins, Tattered; Rampant Foreclosures Have Torn the Very Fabric of the 
Region, CLt.:VF.LAND SCENE, July 9, 2008, http://www.freetimes.com/ stories/15/62/tattered; 
Juliana Barbassa, Report: Minorities Hit by Foreclosures, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2008, 
http://www .usatoda y .com/money/econom y/housi ng/2008-03 -06-m i.nori ty- for eel ose _ N. htm. 
162Mark Gillispie, 84% o.f Local Foreclosures are Subprime Loans, TilE PLAIN DEALER, 
June 23, 2008. http:/lblog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/06/cu yahoga _county_ foreclosures 
8.html. 
163/d. 
104COMMUNITY RESEARCH PA RTNERS, £60 MILLION AND COUNTING: THE COST OF VACANT 
AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TO EIGHT OHIO CiTIES (2008), http://www.community 
researchpartners.org/uploads/publications//FuliReport_Nonembargoed.pdf. 
165See Simon, supra note 1.31. 
l ~>~>sw Lcs Christie. Foreclosure Focus: Why Cleveland'. CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 14, 
2007, hitp://money.cnn.com/2007/ 1 1/12/real_ estate/Cleveland _foreclosure_ factors. 
167David Herszenhom, Bailoul Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, THE NF.w 
YORK TIMES, Oct. 3. 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/I0/04/business/ economy/04bailout. 
html?parmcr=pem1alink&; Press Release. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. Preston Allocates Nearly $4 Billion to Stabilize N·eighborhoods in States and 
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resources like the Neighborhood Stabilization Funds are helpful, but the $25 million 
earmarked for the City of Cleveland does little to address the magnitude of 
Cleveland's vacant property challenge, produced by the foreclosure crisis. 168 The 
most recent plan proposed by the city for the funds is to demolish 1700 vacant homes 
and support other investments like community gardens and rental housing. 169 These 
are good goals, but given the limited resources provided by the federal government, 
these efforts will not be sufticient. Cuyahoga County had roughly 14,000 
foreclosures in 2007 alone, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development estimated more than 23,000 vacant residential addresses were in the 
City of Cleveland in June of 2008. 17° Foreclosure prevention and mediation through 
"work outs" are viable strategies, and several non-profits in the region have been 
leaders in helping promote work outs.171 However, national and state public 
programs to support this work are limited in scope and too little pressure has been 
applied to lenders to work out loans in lieu of foreclosure. 172 The institutional and 
policy arrangements that led to the conditions in Cleveland and other segregated 
markets are cumulative, interactive and historical. As stated earlier, the initial 
red lining of these communities started in the 1930s, '40s, and ' 50s. 173 This lack of 
appropriate credit led to a deteriorating neighborhood in a city with a declining tax 
base for essential services, including schools. With the explosion of credit, 
securitization and the push for new markets, these communities became the focus of 
poor lending, including inappropriate sub-prime and predatory products. To stem the 
tide of foreclosure is a critical intervention but isn' t enough- this would sti ll leave 
these communities marginalized by the larger credit system. Thus solutions must 
look beyond just stemming foreclosure and embrace measures to bring sustainable 
Local Communities Hard-Hit by Foreclosure (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.hud.gov/oflicesl 
cpcVcommunitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg/. 
'
68Press Release, Cleveland City Council, Another Step Taken Toward Breaking the Cycle 
of Abandonment (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.clevelandcitycouncil.org/Home/Newsl 
February42009/tabid/619/ Default.aspx. 
169Henry J. Gomez, Mayor Frank Jackson Wams Federal Funds Usedfor Demolishing 
Abandoned Homes, THE PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 27, 2009, http://blog.cleveland.com/ 
metro/2009/0 1/mayor _frank jackson_ wants_ fede.html. 
170Gabriel Baird, Ohio Foreclosures Hit a Record; Northeast Ohio Sees Some Declines. 
THE PLAfN DEALER, Feb. 12. 2009, http:/lblog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/02/ 
ohio_foreclosures_hit_a_record.html: see also HUD, Neighborhood Stabilization database, 
http://www.huduser.org/DATASETS/nsp_foreclosure _data.html. 
171 A foreclosure "work out" involves resuming payments and arranging to pay past due 
payments over a short period of time, sometimes involving a modification of the mortgage. 
Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Office of Consumer Affairs, Foreclosure Prevention "Work Ou1 
Resolutions, .. http://www.com.state.oh.us/dfi/pub/cons_foreclworkout.pdf (last visited Apr. 
I I, 2009). 
172Dina El Boghdady, HUD ChiifCalls Aid on Mortgage A Failure, THE WASH. POST. 
Dec. 17, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/ 12/ 16/ 
AR2008121603 l77.html; Patrick Mitchell, Data: Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Fixes 
Failing to Work, FORBES, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/ pmewswire/feedsl 
prnewswire/2008/ 12/ 18/pmewswire20081218 1400PR _NEWS_USPR __ DC53586.html. 
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credit back to these neighborhoods. This entire process which marginalizes these 
communities is deeply racialized without there being a need for conscious racial 
animus. 
The expanding recession in Ohio and Not1heast Ohio is placing further financial 
strain on housing stability. The state of Ohio recorded more than 80,000 foreclosure 
filings in 2007, and another 291,000 toreclosures are projected over the next four 
years. m An estimated 420,000 Ohio homeowners are now "underwater" or have 
negative equity, due to loan terms and declining property values. 175 These challenges 
will continllle to grow for Cleveland, Northeast Ohio, and the State until significant 
state and federal reforms stem the crisis. These ongoing challenges also speak to the 
need to not only stem the foreclosure crisis, but to strategically intervene in hard hit 
neighborhoods littered with vacant properties. We also need to reform or strengthen 
fair housing throughout the state, to prevent the next housing crisis and assure that 
sustainable credit becomes available for all Ohioans, inc luding our most 
marginalized communities. 
IV. MOVING FROM CRISIS TO OPPORTUNITY: TRANSFORMATIONAL THINKIN G 
The dire fair housing challenges described in this article present a serious 
problem for social justice advocates and for our nation. Housing and fair credit 
provide more than just shelter and resources in our society; housing and credit are 
transformational vehicles which can be critical pathways or bridges to opportunity. m 
Fair housing provides the best mechanism to produce true integration into 
communities of opportunity. 177 Access to good schools, stable and safe 
neighborhoods, productive employment opportunities and strong professional and 
social networks is dependent on living in or near neighborhoods which contain these 
assets. Therefore, civil rights advocates have rightly focused great attention on fair 
housing, the "last plank" of the civil rights movement as the "structural linchpin" of 
inequality, the critical intervention point to produce a more just and racially 
equitable society .178 
Sustainable credit also is a transfom1ative intervention, opening a number of 
opportunities such as wealth building or aJiowing investments in education or 
17
"'The Center tor Rcsponsibl~ Lending. Projet:ted Foreclosures by State, 
http:i/www.rcsponsiblelcnding.org.lissues/mortgage/ quick-relerences/projected-toreclosures-
hy-state.html (13st visited Apr. II. 200()). 
1;5Jonathan Stempel. One in Five Homeowners with Mortgages Underwater, REUTERS, 
Oct. 3 1, 2008, http://www.rcuters.cum/article/gc03/idUSTRE49S3Q520081 031; Paul Jackson, 
7. 6 Million Borrowers Under.,..:(ller 011 Mortgages: Study, HOUSINGWtRE.COM, Oct. 31, 2008. 
http://www. housi ngwi re.com/2008/ I 0/3 117 6-mi II ion-borrowers-underwater-on-mortgages-
study. 
116See powell, mpra note 102. at \8<J. 
117See id. 
17~0LJVER & SIIAPIRO, supra note 136 (referring to Lawrence Bobo. Keeping !he Linchpin 
in Place: Testing the Multiple Sources of' Opposition to Residential Integration, 2 REVUE 
INTERNATIONAL£ DE PSYC!H)LOCIF SOCIAL£: 305 , 307 ( 1989)); SHERYL D. CASHIN, THE. 
fAILURES OF ( 1TEGRATI01'<: How RACF AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING IHE AMERICAN 0REt\M 
J (2004) ("Housing was the last plank in the civil rights revolution, and it is the realm in 
which we have experienced the fewest integration gains."). 
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traillmg. Sustainable credit can a llow families to survive economic dislocation and 
provide a bridge to new opportunities, like a college education or a home in an 
opportunity-rich neighborhood. Because of the significance of both fair housing and 
sustainable credit, we must continue to push foT the implementation of a true 
transfonnative vision of fa ir housing for our nation. We must not be discouraged by 
the new challenges created by the current housing and credit crisis; we must instead 
utilize this window of opportunity to advocate and implement a transformative vision 
of fair housing. The following section of this article closes by looking at the 
weaknesses of our current methods of promoting fair housing through the 1968 Fair 
Housing Act. We recommend a number of strategies and principles to guide tair 
housing if we are going to achieve the goal of integrated communities of 
opportunity, fair housing for all, and a just sustainable society. 
A. A Review of the FHA: Challenges 
One of the primary limitations of the Fair Housing Act is that it is a tort 
approach, which relies too heavily on proving individual claims.17Y The Act's 
enforcement by the Department of Justice is also underwhelming. The Departmc:nt 
of Justice pursues only hundreds of cases a year, a severe deficiency considering that 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development estimates nearly two million 
acts of housing discrimination occur each year. 180 However, scholars have drawn 
attention to the fact that the Act requires the federa l government to affirmatively 
further fair housing. 181 The 1968 Civil Rights Act has two "affirmatively further" 
provisions: § 3608(e)(5) requires the Secretary of HUD to "administer the programs 
and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to 
further the policies of this title."182 Section 3608(d) notes that other federal 
departments and agencies have the same obligation. 183 Wagman writes that in the 
Supreme Court case Trajjicante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the Com1 
refers to the purpose of the legislation. which was to "foster integration and counter 
discrimination." 1 ~4 In National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 
Boston Chapter v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Judge Breyer emphasized that Title VIJI addressed segregation as well as 
179Brian Patrick Larkin, The Forty-Year "'First Step"': The Fair Housing Act ns an 
Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, I 07 COLUM . L. REV. 1617, 1647 l2007); John 
Boger. Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the Next 
Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1553, 1584 (1992-1993). For a review of the proof standard. 
see also John 0. Calmore, Fair Housing the Black Poor, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE RF.V . 605 , 620, 
646 ( 1984) and Florence Roisman & Philip Tegeler, improving and Expanding Housi11g 
Opportunity for Poor People of Color, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 3 12, 315- I 6 ( 1990). 
180powell, suprcr note I 02, at 6 I 6. 
'~' Florence Wagman Roisman, A Place to Cull Home? A[fordabh· Housing l.1.wes ill 
America, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 353 (2007). 
182The Civil Rights Act of I 968, U.S.C. § 3608 (1968), http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
uscode/html/uscodc42/usc_sec_ 42_00003608----000-.htmlllast visited Apr. 1 1, 2009}. 
I Slid. 
184
Roisman, supra note 181 , al 364; see generally Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 409 U.S. 284 ( 1976 ). 
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discrimination. ll'' Despite these precedents, this important provision is critical and 
has not bct:n interpreted in a broad enough manner to meet this goal. 
B. U~ing Fair Housing w Prol'ide True Integration with Opportuni~r 
Another challenge" ith our current paradigm for thinking of fair housing is that it 
docs not din:ctly focus enough energy on affimlativcly connecting marginalized 
communities to opportunity. Racial integration is an important and critical goal, but 
equally important is tme integration into opportunity. Our model of "opportunity 
based housing'· interprets the primary goal of fair housing as providing tair housing 
choices to all people in communities of opportunity. 1kr· To tmly meet the goals of 
fair housing, we must turn out resources toward an opportunity oriented model of 
housing and community development. We must strategically link efforts to build 
and create opportunities in distressed areas, while allowing access to communities of 
oppoltunity and other opportun ity structures to marginalized populations. This 
model and approach means focusing on more than just assuring housing mobility, 
but also assuring that sustainable and equitable community development improves 
marginalized communities, and that marginalized communities have direct access to 
critical opportunities like high performing schools. 1 ~7 
This new approach to fair housing also means retiring the old twentieth century 
dichotomy of always relating the suburbs with opportunity. Opportunity is dynamic 
and fluid in our metropolitan regions; many older, mature inner suburbs have 
declined while some urban neighborhoods ha\'e rebounded. Moving people of color 
indiscriminately to the suburbs does not guarantee they are moving into healthy, 
stable communities of opportunity. Our efforts to link people of color to these 
communities must respect this changing urban geography- this could mean 
prioritizing moving to affluent suburbs and assuring aflordable housing in 
maintained, redeveloping or gentrifYing communities. 
C. Reinvigorating the Federal Role in the Huusing Market: Fannie. Freddie, and 
the Future vf Fair I lousing 
The federal government must play a significant role in addressing both this crisis 
and aftirmatively tluthering fair housing in the future. The tederal government has 
always played a role in our nation's housing market- U.S. government action in the 
wake of th~ Depression built the foundation of homcowncrship and the American 
middle class. Loca l actions arc critical. but must be ful ly supported by federal 
resources and policy. Budget deficits arc already plaguing our State and local 
budgets. and the philanthropic sector's assets have been impacted by the crisis on 
Wall Street. Non-profits. many of which are funded by governments or foundations. 
are dealing with resource shortages and increasing demands on their service. Local 
governments. philanthropy. non-profits, and states do not have the resources to 
address the systemic and widespr~ad challenges facing our nation. 
~~~Ro isman , supra note 181. at 36 7. 
1 ~6JOHN A. p~)WELL, ET AL.. THE KIRWA\1 I NSL roR l iiL S ILI>Y o r RACE AND E1 HN ICITY. 
C m.t\1UI'o. ITI"-S ~''F OPI'ORrUNJTY: A FRAMI:WORK fUR A MoRt EQlJIT,\BLE AND Su sTAI'IAflLE 
Fl'l"L'R~ FUR ALL (2007). hlip:/1\\ ww.kll"\\ aninstitutc.org/publicationspresentationsl 
publicationslindcx.php. 
'~'ld. 
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This resource mismatch is evident in Ohio. Consider that the State of Ohio's 
total projected 201 0 general revenue expenditures were $29 billion, and that in 2006, 
the top fifty philanthropic foundations giving in Ohio spent $350 million . 18~ These 
ligures are dwarfed by the size ofthe initial TARP legislation ($700 billion) and the 
February 2008 stimulus package ($789 billion).189 Prior to February of 2008, the 
federal government's effort to solve the current crisns had been uncoordinated and 
disconnected from the fair housing roots of the crisis. Too little attention had been 
paid to the interrelated nature of vacancy and abandonment in our cities, the crisis on 
Wall Street and the global credit market. Unfortunately, these issues continue to be 
thought of as largely separate. So while there is a massive effort to stabilize banks 
and other lending insnitutions, the federal rescue package is only weakly related to 
the continuing forec losure cris is that is destabilizing housing markets, neighborhoods 
and cities across the country. There are good reasons to believe that these 
fragmented approaches will not work and that instead, a more deliberate effort to 
address and I ink these efforts is required. 1'10 
I. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Another opportunity tor a renewed federal role is the new status of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. Fannie and Freddie were government chartered, publicly traded 
companies before their historic takeover by the federal government in September 
2008. 191 They are currently under "conservatorship"; Treasury Secretary Paulson 
defetTed decisions regarding the mission of the companies for the next President and 
Congress. 192 As newly emerging entities of the federal government, what are the 
opportunities for holding Fannie and Freddie to the requirement of •·affirmatively 
furthering fair housing" as mandated in 1968 Fair Housing Act? 193 As Fannie Mae 
and Freddie hold about tive trillion dollars of housing mortgages (about 70% of all 
tH~For an overview of the projected biennial Ohio state budget. please see the Ohio Office 
of Budget and Management's budget overview, Ohio Office of Budget and Management, 
Budget, hup:J/obm.ohio.gov/sectionpages/Budget/FY I OJ 1/ExecutiveBudget.aspx (last visited 
Apr. I I , 2009). For a listing of the largest philanthropic organizations giving in Ohio, see The 
Foundation Center, Top 50 U.S. Foundations Award Grants in the State of Ohio, circa 2006, 
http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/statistics/pdf/03 fund geo/2006/50 found states/f oh 
_06.pdf(last visited Apr .. I I , 2009). - - - - -
189Neighborhood Link, The 2009 Stimulus Package Explained, http:// 
www.neighborhoodlink.com/article/Communityffhe _ 2009 _ Stimulus_Package _Explained 
(last visited Apr. ll, 2009). 
190See .IOHN A. POWELL, THE KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNJC'ITY, 
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC STIMULUS PLAN ON COMMUNITIES OF 
CoLOR (2009), http://4909e99d35cada6Je71757471 b724Jbe7Je5Jel4.gripelements.com/ 
publicntionslpreliminary _repon_on_stimulus_impacts_feb2009.pdf. 
1
Q
1David Ellis, US. Seizes Freddie and Fannie, CCNMONEY.C'OM, Sept. 7. 2008, 
http:/ /money. mn.com/2008/09/07/news/compan i es/fannie _freddie/index .htm'?post version=20 
08090720. 
193Fair Housing Act supra note II, at Executive Order 12892. 
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new home loans), these entities set much of the standard for the entire market. 1 ~4 
Could the federal govemment proactively utilize Fannie and Freddie to meet the 
goals of the Fair Housing Act? 
What about the other financial institutions backed by federal bailout funds'? 
From the emergence of the secondary market through the work of FHA, the federal 
government historically has been instrumental in expanding housing opportunities 
and developing our nation's middle class. but these efforts largely ignored or 
marginalized communities of color. It is imperative that the concerns and interest of 
communities of color not be ignored again. A deliberate effort needs to be made to 
reset loans, to stabilize the market, to develop appropriate products, to extend 
appropriate credit and to affirn1atively further fair housing. We believe these new 
policy goals should be addressed together to support the opportunity based vision of 
fair housing discussed above.195 
On February 18, 2009, President Obama unveiled a new plan to address the credit 
and housing crisis. 196 His plan brings at least $75 billion in additional assistance to 
encourage banks to work out loan terms (through financial incentives to financial 
institutions) with delinquent borrowers. 197 The plan also dedicates investment into 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to stabi lize both entities and aUows refinancing options 
for "underwater" mortgage holders whose loans are currently held or backed by 
these entities. 198 This enhanced tederal role is a good start but needs bolstering to 
assure financial institutions cooperate, ideally through federal pressure on financial 
institutions, especially institutions that receive federal T ARP funds. ln addition, this 
new plan is just a start, and the federal government must begin to look toward the 
long term needs of marginalized communities of color who have been locked out of 
the prime credit market. The federal government must assure that sustainable cr;!dit 
products are available to these communities and that federal resources are directed to 
communities most traumatized by the dislocations and vacant properties created by 
the crisis. The federal government must take this opportunity to use its newfound 
leverage in the housing an.d credit market to produce true fair housing opportunities 
for all communities. 
D. The Future: How Do We Structure Fair Housing Policies to Reflect this New 
Paradigm? 
In designing fair housing initiatives and policies we must use new principles to 
guide our thinking. A new era of systemic social justice challenges requires a new 
approach and response, a new paradigm and way of thinking about our challenges. 
We need to be targeted, outcome driven, tailor our policies and actions to situational 
1 '~4Alan Ziebe1, Fannie. Freddie to Pay $294m in Bonuses, 9 NEWS, Apr. 4, 2009, 
http:/174. 125.95. 132/search?q=cache:ZHSbZFXnLjwJ :news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx%3 Fi 
d% 3D797 550+F annie+F rcddie~·5+tri Ilion+ 70%25&cd= 1 &hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=fire 
fox-a . 
195See POWELL, s11pra note 190. 
1Q6President Barack Obama. Address on the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan 
(Feb. 18, 2009). http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/l8/us/politics/18text-obama.html? _r= I . 
197/d. 
JQ~ /d. 
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constraints. be systems oriented and multifaceted, and inclusive in process. 
Universal strategies, policies and programs and "one size fits all'' solutions will not 
address the complex dynamks impeding fair housing. 
I. Be Systems Oriented and Multi-Faceted 
The root of the housing and credit crisis is a systemic challenge which requires a 
new method of analysis and calls for different types of solutions. Our traditional 
"'Newtonian" perspective on causation utilized a simple linear model of determining 
causes and identifying solutions. 1y q A systemic approach to understanding causation 
moves away from this linear approach, recognizing that causation is impacted by 
multiple tactors or represents a system of interactions among various factors. 
C ausation is reciprocal , mutual, and cumulative. In understanding the fair housing 
problems created by the housing and credit crisis, these dynamics become quite 
clear. The crisis in communities of color was not just the result of one factor but the 
result of multiple factors, involving borrowers, neighborhoods, lenders, the financial 
markets and others. These factors reinforced each other and worked together to 
produce disparate outcomes in communities of color. As Jeffrey Sachs notes in The 
End f?/ Poverty, "economies are complex systems." Sach's calls systems thinking 
''clinical economics."200 
To adequately intervene in these complex systems, we must fully understand 
them and design our responses with c lear recognition of the systems' complex 
interactions. Our solutions should both provide comprehensive relief while looking 
for strategic intervention points within the system which would have the greatest 
i.mpact. In the case of the foreclosure crisis, too many responses have not taken this 
''clinical" or systemic approach. For example, extensive efforts have been made to 
prevent foreclosure through mediation or "work outs" but these strategies will only 
be cftective in a broad way if other factors in the system cooperate. So. if servicers 
are not coerced or mandated to be more involved in work outs or are nonresponsive 
to homeowners seeking help, then public policy efforts to encourage work outs 
among borrowers will not be an effective transformative strategy to end the crisis. 
2. Targeted Universalism and Tailoring to Situational Constraints 
Universal policies assume a universal nom1. This conception, in fact, often 
retlects a particular in its design and implementation. For example, Social 
Security-often described as the quintessential universal policy- was universal only 
insofar as the universal was an able-bodied white male working outside the bome.201 
En its early years, the elderly were excluded since they had not been in the work force 
long enough to qualify.20~ Under the cultural norms of the era, men were the primary 
wage-earners, and women typically worked in the home. Unpaid household labor 
a nd child rearing responsibilities are not counted toward Social Security earnings. 
1
''''D.A . fRI·.EDMAN, LIN~.AR STATISTICAL MODELS FOR CAUSATION: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2 
l2005 ). http://www. wiley.com/legac y!wi leychi/eosbs/pdfslbsa598.pdf. 
!lltlJeftrcy Sachs, Developme111 Ec.f.Jnomics as Clinical Economics, THE GLOBALIST, July 5, 
20t)5, hUp:/iwww.thcglobatist.com/StoryJd.aspx?Story1d=4602. 
2c'1P()" I.LL ~upra note 190, at 7. 
2'12/d 
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Even today, women \vho take time off to raise children or select careers with more 
flc:xibk working hours will cam less. on average, then their male counterparts, and 
''ill theretore have lower social security benefits upon retirement. And because of 
exclusions of agricultural and domestic workers-exclusions built-in to appease 
Southern resistance to the Act- sixty-five percent of African Americans were 
initially denied its protections.~01 
Unfortunately, when based on a rigid particular (rather than reflecting the 
different situations of people and communities) ... universal" programs are as likely to 
exacerbate inequality as to reduce it.l114 All communities and people are influenced 
by a set of situational constraints. For marginalized communities and populations 
these situational constraints can be severe and create a tremendous impediment to 
oppottunity. For example, borrowers in communities of color were far more 
vulnerable lo subprime mortgage brokers than the general population; they had a 
number of situational constraints which enhanced their vu lnerability to predatory 
lcnders. ~•Js Factors such as redu<.:ed financial literacy, heightened economic 
insecurity and community conditions created different vulnerabilities for these 
populations.~06 Meanwhile, the lending system changed with rapid growth in new 
types of predatory loans and actors due to changes in the financial industry.207 
Our current protections to assure fair lending did not take all of these situational 
constraints or dynamic changes in the mortgage market into account. Policies which 
may have protected the majority population were very insufficient to protect 
marginalized communities who are situated differently and more vulnerable. Our 
policies and initiatives to promote Fair Housing must accept and be designed by 
these situational constraints. Fair housing solutions and norms must be sensitive to 
the hyper vulnerability of marginalized communities of color. The critical insight is 
this: treating people who are situated differently as if they were equally able to 
access the benefits of "universal" policies can in fact lead to greater inequities. In 
the case of the foreclosure epidemic, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development neighborhood stabilization funds represent an intervention which must 
be strategically targeted. Spreading neighborhood stabilization funds across all 
neighborhoods would provide limited relief and probably no relief to neighborhoods 
with the greatest concentrations of foreclosed properties. 
The extreme concentrations of foreclosure in these communities have situated 
them in a delicate situation, and in some cases are sending them spiraling into a state 
of permanent distress. These communities require a different approach, and more 
resources to arrest their fall. Some analysts feel that President Obama's new 
foreclosure plalll (if it is successful) also represents a strategy which targets those 
most impacted directly by the crisis (emphasizing individuals who currently cannot 
make mortgage payments).208 These types of targeted strategies will become more 
20
'/d. at 8. 
21~/d. 
20~/d. at 7. 
206Seeid. 
=<•"see id. 
~0~Edmund Andrews. Ohama Plan on Hmt\ing Said to Push On Lenders, N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 
I 6. 2009, at B I. 
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important as the limited resources available to counter the crisis are used 
strategically to have tlhe greatest impact. 
We argue fo r moving beyond just simple targeted policies but also to look at a 
third possibility. Universal and targeted approaches are false choices. There is a 
third possibility, what we call "targeted universalism." This is an approach that 
supports the needs of the particular while acknowledging that we are all part of the 
same social fabriG. Targeting within universalism means being proactive and goal 
oriented about ach ievable outcomes. As an initial step. an impact assessment could 
be employed to gauge how a universal policy would impact particular groups. But 
an impact assessment alone is not enough. In a complex, real world setting, policies 
have unintended consequences and resistance that thwart policy intentions. It is 
critical that targeted universal policies set clear goals and use mechanisms to closely 
monitor and conect for negative feedback loops and other resistance. 
3. Being Goal Oriented and Inclusive in Process 
Systems are inherently dynamic and subject to change. For this reason, we 
cannot allow our fair housing efforts be dominated by process but instead should be 
goal tocused. In the case of the foreclosure crisis, we cannot allow ourselves the 
luxury of expecting the dynamics producing the crisis to remain stagnant and 
unchanging. Housing in particular is a very dynamic system; housing prices, interest 
rates. credit and the economy all interact to influence the environment of the housing 
market. This has direct implication to fair housing. When market conditions are hot, 
policies such as inclusionary zoning would be a very successful strategy for 
expanding affordable housing opportunities in opportunity rich areas. but when the 
housing market cools, builders are not building as much new housing, and 
inclusionary zoning suddenly becomes a less successful strategy. l f we were goal 
oriented in this scenario, we would alter our policy approach to focus on other means 
of providing affordable housing in those communities, such as targeting Section VJII 
vouchers. 
Simi lar unexpeGted dynamic changes have already occurred as a result of this 
crisis. The tightened credit market has diminished the market value of the tax credit 
and has substantially limited the eftectiveness of using Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits to build affordable housing.2n" The LIHTC program is the primary affordable 
housing production program in our nation. m As producTion falls due to market 
dynamics, we must adjust our strategies or we will face an even greater shortage of 
affordable housing in the flllurc. 
In the case of the foreclosure crisis, we must be prepared to change course if 
system dynamics alter the tactors causing tort:closure. For example. traditional 
assumptions an: that 11.mjus1 loan terms are the principle cause of foreclosure. 211 As a 
result. many of our policy solutions are targeting modifying loan 1enns to resolve the 
crisis. But, given the housing and credit crisis· impact on the economy and the 
"''YThl' Low-I ncome Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC') program is run by the IRS and allows 
companies to invest in low·income housing. while recei ving ten years of tax credits. A. 
Siudzinski, Field Guide to Loll'· lncome Housing Tax Credits, R EALTOR.ORG, 
http://www. rca It or .org/1 ibrary/ I i brary/tg 720. 
~1\l.S't't! id 
l i 1See ROGERS, .l'lf{Wa note J. 
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recession, job losses or loss of income may become the primary factor causing 
foreclosure in the near future. ln this scenario, policies and initiatives set up to alter 
loan tenns would be insufficient to keep borrowers in their homes if most are 
entering foreclosure due to income loss via joblessness. Thus, we must remain 
flexible to change our strategies and approaches as the complexities of the system 
change. By maintaining a goal-oriented approach to fair housing and staying away 
from a process orientation, we can remain tlexible enough to adapt to these changing 
conditions. 
Finally, as we design new approaches to housing, credit, and fair housing in the 
aftermath of this crisis, we must assure that marginalized commun ities, in particular 
communities of color that are most impacted by the crisis, are at the table and 
included in this redesign. We recommend creating a public/private commission that 
would look at what it would take to affirmatively address both the housing and credit 
needs of historically marginal communities. The goal should be not just to stem 
foreclosures or even end intentional discriminattion, but to e liminate the dual housing 
and credit market and its negative effects. This cannot be done one law suit at a 
time. The Bush administration was sensitive to the need to affirmatively address the 
disparities in the housing market; this sensitivity to this need should be applauded.212 
Unfortunately, the federal government's unregulated market approach did not 
work. The Ford Foundation, under the leadlership of Melvin Oliver and Frank 
DeGiovanni, also created a program to bring in more people or color and marginal 
communities into the housing market, through the Community Advantage 
Program.213 This program was a relative success. It was not implemented to scale 
and did not pay enough attention to the importance of place, but proves that 
sustainable home ownership programs will work in marginalized communities. We 
need to address these issues pragmatically, paying attention to changes in the market 
and understanding what programs. policies and credit instrumc:nts work and are 
sustainable. 
As we remake the market and credit systems, we should be deliberate not to 
continue the previous models which used the majority population as a model to 
frame and design policies. Marginalized communit ies are differently situated and 
require different credit instruments to be sustainable. We must embrace an approach 
and process which is inclusive at all stages. where marginalized people and 
communities have a direct voice in designing responses to t~1ir housing challenges. 
l.n addition, there is a great need to develop, extend, and connect local community 
development capacity. 
In short, everyone should have an opportunity to give voice to the future of their 
commumt1es. This includes supporting efforts to improve the participation of 
marginalized groups in policy design, and improving data collection. monitoring and 
evaluation of local, state and federal programs. Also. this means identifying and 
lifting up or bringing to scale programs that are working to produce fair housing and 
credit options in marginalized communities.214 We cannot design systemic reforms 
that will produce fair credit, fair housing. and a just society without deliberately 
212Stevcn R. Weisman, Bush Qffers Reliefji>r Some on Home Louns, THJ; N.Y. T IMES. 
Aug. 3 \ , 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31 /business/3 1 homc.html. 
2130LJVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 136. 
~ 14POWELL, supra note 190. 
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projet:ting the voice or marginalized communities made vulnerable by the current 
institutional arrangements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The world, our ~.:redit market. and our society continues to be dynamic and grows 
increasingly more interconnected every day. A number of complex global systems 
have emerged in the new globa l et:onomy. these t:omplex systems requires a new 
framework to underswnd our fair housing chalkngcs and to reach 1air housing goals. 
This systemic era requires new ways of thinking, a new paradigm to identify the 
causes, and ~ll lutions to inequity in our sodety. We must understand how systems 
(like the glob<tl credit market) can produce disparate impacts in our neighborhoods 
and communities. We must also understand how to identify sysuematic reforms to 
address problems and seek critica l intervention points to produce transformative 
change. As we look toward the future of fair housing, we should orient our work 
around two clear goals. First. we must end the dual credit system, which has further 
exploited and marginalized communities of color. This provision also means 
assuring that our response to ending the dual credit system does not exacerbate 
ex isting challenges by instituting another era of redlining for marginalized 
communities. We must assure that in the future, communities of color are brought 
into and have full (and equal) participation in the credit market. We must implement 
policies. cred it products. and tools which assure that communities of color are 
prov ided sustainable credit options. Second. we must continue to work to create a 
society where fair housing produces affordable housing in communities of 
opportun ity. This opportunity based approach to tair housing must be the 
fu ndamental premise guiding all of our tair housing and community development 
ert<Hts. To have a just and susta inable nation and society, we must assure that fair 
housing opportunity is avai lable to all. 
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APPENDIX 
Fig. I: Our housing market has gone from a two or three party system to a very 
complicated system that very few people understand. Our laws, regulation and 
oversight is based on the three party system. Source: two and three party system 
graph created by the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race & Ethnicity, multiparty 
system figure created by Chris Peterson at the University of Utah. Figure adapted 
from presentation delivered at the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race & Ethnicity 
National Convening on Subprime Lending, Foreclosure and Race October 2-3, 2008, 
available at http://www. ki rwan i nstitutc.orgievents/arch i ve/su bprimeconven ingl 
agenda.php. 
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